Security, explained
Trust is built.
One detail at a time.
What the vault protects, what happens when you unlock it, and what the boundaries of the model are. The technical documentation is part of the product presentation.
01 / The file on disk
Vault encryption.
The vault contains a JSON payload encrypted with AES-256-GCM. A random 32 byte data key is generated upon creation. The master password protects a copy of this key through a key derived with scrypt.
| ELEMENT | DOCUMENTED IMPLEMENTATION |
|---|---|
| Authenticated encryption | AES-256-GCM |
| Data key | 32 random bytes from OsRng |
| Nonces and tags | 12 byte random nonce per cipher, 16 byte tag |
| Key derivation | scrypt · N=32768, r=8, p=1 · output 32 bytes |
| Get in | 16 random bytes, distinct for master and recovery |
| Persistence | Local file with encrypted payload and previous .bak copy |
GCM authenticates encrypted blobs. The external header is not included as additional authenticated data: the format offers no proven protection against the restoration of an old valid copy.
02 / The access keys
Master password and recovery.
The master password is not stored as a separate verifiable hash. The unlock derives the key, decrypts the data key protection, and authenticates the payload.
The recovery code protects a second copy of the same data key. Keep it in a separate place from the vault: it allows you to recover access and set a new master password.
03 / When the vault is open
Locking, memory and clipboard.
There are manual locking and inactivity locking. The deadline is checked with each command and by a thread every five seconds; the delay may increase during long operations. The interface clears the session state when it receives the lock event.
Once the vault is unlocked, the decrypted data passes through the Rust process, the React interface and the IPC. Some Rust keys use Zeroizing, but Complete memory clearing is not guaranteed, especially JavaScript.
Deferred clipboard cleaning only empties them if the contents are still the copied ones. It cannot delete copies already held in the clipboard history or by other applications.
04 / Beyond the local file
What data can come out.
The vault is local and the project does not have its own cloud service to synchronize it. Some functions can still make network requests:
- Pwned Passwords: upon confirmation, sends the first five hexadecimal characters of the SHA-1 hash with a padding request. The suffix is compared locally. The normal connection metadata remains visible.
- Site icons: downloading from DuckDuckGo reveals the requested domain. The preference may be active by default, and saving an account may trigger the request.
- Cloud Folders: the transport is carried out by the external provider's application, if used.
Browser fill
The extension receives selected username and password only during filling. The master password is not sent to you from the quick panel. The credentials entered in the fields are then accessible to the destination site.
Local communication uses Native Messaging, a helper and a su socket 127.0.0.1 authenticated with token to boot. The channel does not use TLS and does not isolate the app from malware running as the same Windows user.
05 / Transparency
Context matters.
The operating system, the user session and local webview code form part of the trusted computing base. Encryption at rest cannot protect against every form of device compromise.
- There is no documented independent security audit or certification.
- Tests on memory, IPC permissions, local bridge, concurrency and durability remain open.
- The Rust client does not apply a documented rolling delay to unlock attempts.
- The initial baseline demonstrated no setup signature and automatic updates. Later releases describe a signature-verified update: check the notes and the actual installer for your version.
- An outdated automated suite does not certify all real interactions, browsers, or installations.
1f09624, dated November 17, 2026. It does not constitute a new audit or testing of the app.